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PREFACE
This article presents a controversial hypothetical approach to a side of the
polemic regarding extraordinary rendition. War is not always controlled by rules,
fairness, or ethics. The United States would prefer the foregoing if forced to go to
war, but the enemy may not follow the same approach. As a result, the United
States becomes hampered by unilaterally self-imposed rules and standards.
Conceivably, we could fail to achieve our military objective because of the enemy's
adherence to a very different approach and beliefs regarding warfare. Were we to
have the privilege of fighting under relatively similar rules with the other side, the
polemic on extraordinary rendition might not be an issue.
The author recalls the pre-Dream Team days of Olympic sports. The concept
of amateurism was very important. The author posits that other nations, notably the
Soviet Union, did not see it that way.' We lost basketball games under our concept.
Perhaps reluctantly, we went to a professionally dominated Dream Team to balance
the athletic battle.2 Our Olympic response was in one sense a "cop out." In another
sense, it was a calculated effort to deal with the new reality.
The author recognizes not only the unpopularity of extraordinary rendition, but
also the higher aims and goals of our adherence to international norms of decency,
even in war. Another, perhaps weaker, analogy is the retrenchment and yielding of
precious First Amendment rights because of security and terrorism concerns. The
United States also engaged in asymmetric warfare during the Revolutionary War,
when the colonists used the Native American approach in fighting battles. The
Native American approach differed dramatically from the British and European
"open field" style of battle. Today, we call this guerilla warfare. One might even
posit that extraordinary rendition, seen through the lens of asymmetric war, has two
scopes: (1) a military scope; and (2) an academic scope. Both are appropriate; each
comes from its own foundation, purpose, aim, and experience. While some
academics have significant military experience, some military luminaries have
significant academic experience. For example, General David Petraeus,
Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and Commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, and Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, each received a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Princeton
University. In the author's view, academics tend to have a deontological or Kantian
approach towards extraordinary rendition. Laws, rules, appropriateness, and the
"right thing" to do, represent dominant modes of thought. Dominant modes
represent proper motives and actions in a civilized society. The military, while
1. George Vecsey, Amateurs at the Olympics? Not in Your Dreams, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2008),
http://nytimes.com/2008/08/06/sports/olympics/06vessey.html?pagewanted=print (discussing Soviet
Union's disregard for the concept of amateurism in the Olympics).
2. Damon Hack, 'Dream Team' Can Do No Better Than Bronze, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/27/sports/olympics/27cnd-men-hoops.html (discussing America's
recruitment of professional basketball players for the 1992 Olympics in response to the Soviet Union's
defeat of its all-amateur team in 1988).
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cognizant of the foregoing in terms of rules of engagement and adherence to
Geneva protocols and conventions, must nevertheless deal with actual combat
encounters where the enemy may not have the same moral compass. As an
analogy, an army using the Marquis of Queensbury rules may come up against
street fighters using sticks and stones. This is where symmetrical and asymmetrical
warfare impinge on the application of extraordinary rendition. Simply, and in
recognition of the well-worn clich6, war is hell.
Finally, as a military air-combat veteran and an academic, the author has
enjoyed discussion in both worlds, often taking the opposite side to further debate,
discernment, and scrutiny. This preface merely sets the stage for recognition of the
politically-incorrect approach towards the use of extraordinary rendition. This
article posits another approach of the polemic on, extraordinary rendition, along
with a structural proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy, inherent in any activity carried out by the state's executive
authorities, foments political posturing, accusations, and activist agendas. Such
agendas often target the opposition party in power and magnify every possible hint
of secrecy as evidence of ostensible abuse. The agendas also support allegations of
maltreatment that obscure the boundary between inflammatory rhetoric and
disinterested reality. For example, President George W. Bush's use of
extraordinary rendition eschewed calm objectivity usually found in legal scholars
with nefarious inferences that reify stellar fictions into a semblance of substantive
facts. The result, in retrospect, consists of a largely inextricable convolution of
myth with reason and consequently more obfuscation than clarity on the matter of
resolving the core legal questions.
President Barack H. Obama, while still a candidate in 2007, announced his
unequivocal intention to end the practice of extraordinary rendition if elected.3
Upon accession, however, the President acted contrarily, announcing instead his
decision to maintain the noted practice.' His response to critics has been an
assurance that he would increase the level of monitoring in an effort to prevent
incidences of harsh interrogation. Instead, the President has substantively preserved
the integrity of the entire apparatus from the previous administration, including the
same reliance on diplomatic safeguards against the possibility of harsh
interrogation.' The only apparent difference between the two administrations
3. Roger Strother, Obama Administration to Continue Extraordinary Rendition Program,
Promises Oversight, OMB WATCH (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10336 (relating, in
part, the President's pronouncement in the July 2007 edition of Foreign Affairs to end "the practices of
shipping away prisoners in the dead of night to be tortured in far-off countries," and contrasting this
against the new administration's contrary decision to continue condoning the practice of extraordinary
rendition while also promising to "rely on assurances from the receiving country" as its form of
monitoring, exactly the same approach as taken by the previous administration).
4. Id.
5. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 27, 2009); See Strother, supra note 3;
see also David Johnston, US. Says Rendition to Continue, but with More Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
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appears to be a plan to encourage the inspectors general of selected executive
agencies, namely, the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Defense, to
file a joint annual report concerning the practice.6 Given the immediacy of the
relevant events as they have reportedly transpired in prior cases of possible
maltreatment of apprehended persons, merely encouraging a joint annual report is
illusory at best and arguably farcical on balance. This is a curious turn of events in
view of the vehement opposition to the practice voiced by supporters of the current
President during his candidacy when decisions relating to the practice lay in the
hands of the previous administration.
The opposition party's administration has, by now, enjoyed almost two years
to study the issue and take the appropriate action to demonstrate whether the most
extreme claims of the prior administration's violations of human dignity did indeed
rise to a level that would merit correction by executive order. Yet no such
demonstration has occurred.' In light of this fact, it is worthy of concession that
perhaps the practice of extraordinary rendition, actively pursued since early in the
administration of President William J. Clinton,' has always rested upon more solid
legal ground than activist critics energetically attempted to portray during the last
administration. This possibility suggests a new question for legal scholars: if the
practice of extraordinary rendition suffers no lacunae of logic under the literal
interpretation of the law, while nevertheless posing a hazard vis-d-vis the
sensibilities of a civilized State, perhaps the real issue is a question of judicial
failure, the inadequacy in the available judicial edifices to check unilateral action
24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25tendition.html (reiterating the former
candidate's announcement to end the practice, contrary to his decision upon accession to duplicate the
previous administration's use of ordinary diplomatic channels to seek assurances against torture).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4895 (Jan. 27, 2009); Strother, supra note 3.
7. Greg Miller, Obama Preserves Renditions as Counter-Terrorism Tool, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2009), http://www.articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/01/nation/na-renditionl (relating the current
administration's choice to preserve the practice of extraordinary rendition while evidently closing only
the most visible CIA prison sites and the Guantinamo detention facility, creating the paradoxical effect
of forcing the administration to rely more heavily on extraordinary rendition than under the previous
administration due to the narrower range of counterterrorist options that remain; indeed a "little-noticed
provision states that the instructions to close the CIA's secret prison sites 'do not refer to facilities used
only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis'); see, e.g, Daphne Eviatar, Obama Administration
Seeks Re-Hearing in Extraordinary Rendition Case, WASH. INDEP. (Jun. 12, 2009, 4:37PM),
http://www.washingtonindependent.com/46882/Obama-administration-seeks-re-hearing-in-extraordinar
y-rendition-case (relating the fact that the new administration is continuing, hence condoning, the policy
of combating lawsuits that allege torture by proxy under scenarios of extraordinary rendition by
reference to the need to protect state secrets); see also Christina Cowger & Robin Kirk, Extraordinary
Rendition anda Missing Speaker, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 15, 2010, 9:20AM), http://www.newsobser
ver.com/2010/03/15/385814/extraordinary-rendition-and-a.html (recounting former Irish Defense
Forces officer Edward Horgan, now an activist against extraordinary rendition, whose visa the U.S.
State Department revoked without explanation prior to another of a series of annually planned visits to
the U.S. to speak before public audiences; the article observes that the new administration's Department
of Justice has continued to block legal challenges to extraordinary rendition in the same manner as under
the previous administration).
8. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary
Rendition 'Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005 at 106, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2006/10/30/061030ta talk mayer (providing details by Michael Scheuer, chief planner of the
practice of extraordinary rendition under President Clinton from its inception in 1995 under Presidential
Decision Directive 39,U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, (Jun. 21, 1995).
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on the part of the executive branch across national boundaries. In view of this
possibility, it is high time to look at this old question and analyze the principles that
should guide a resolution without the conceptual bias that hindered this goal during
the first seven years of the current state of war.
Extraordinary rendition is the activity of transferring suspected terrorists or
other criminal elements across national boundaries without benefit of formal legal
proceedings, most commonly ascribed to various State foreign-intelligence
apparatus, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States, the
Sakerhetspolisen (Sdpo) in Sweden, or Jihiz al-Mukh~barit al-'Ammat al-
MiSriyyah 9 in Egypt. Strictly understood, if standard rendition falls properly within
the definition of extradition as governed by treaty, extraordinary rendition differs in
the latter detail. Thus, it is simply extradition unbounded by treaty.0 Under this
view, state executive authorities coordinate across national boundaries without
legal or judicial review." As a result, this type of rendition is construable as a
perversion of an openly acknowledged but contestable practice, which manifests
itself in part in State officials covertly rendering to foreign agencies individuals
suspected of involvement in terrorism against private citizens or public entities. 2
Discussing the implications of permitting such a practice in democratic societies,
Philippe Sands wrote, "[i]f you send out a message that you consider the rules to be
obsolete and incapable of meeting new paradigms, you prevent yourself from
challenging others who then act in the same way."" Sands's deliberate use of the
term "paradigms" is a reference to an interpretation under the previous
administration of relevant laws in the current state of war, discussed below in Part
IV. As noted above, the exercise of extraordinary rendition per se began early in
the administration of President Clinton. A limited number of transnational transfers
of this type reportedly occurred prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks against the
U.S."' These renditions have bypassed strict legal procedure normally expected in
cases of treaty-based extradition. According to the activist Center for Human
Rights and Global Justice, "[u]sual destinations for rendered suspects are reported
to be States such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria, all
of which have been implicated by the U.S. State Department for using torture in
interrogation."" Harsh interrogation has allegedly followed under the aegis of
certain foreign governments. In a few instances, the apprehended person was
9. Jihiz al-MukhAbarit al-'Ammat al-Miq riyyah [L 1Gall G ' I - -.-+], [Egyptian
General Intelligence Directorate].
10. Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price ofSecrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1405, 1416
(Jun. 2008) ("Rendition operates within the rule of law; extraordinary rendition falls outside.").
I1. Id. ("Rendition brings suspects to federal or state court; extraordinary rendition does not.").
12. Id. at 1432 (discussing President George W. Bush's acknowledgment of renditions taking
place "to protect people").
13. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Lawless World? The Bush Administration and Iraq: Issues of
International Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 295, 312 (2005).
14. Fisher, supra note 10, at 1418-19.
15. ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON INT'L HUM. RTS. ET AL., ToRTURE BY
PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" 8
(2004) [hereinafter TORTURE BY PROXY].
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evidently a victim of erroneous identification.' 6 Both of these outcomes, oversight
and error, are of primary concern in any analysis that seeks to recommend a
structural remedy.
The present discussion explores the interaction among the phenomenon of
extraordinary rendition, the potential for subjecting apprehended suspects to harsh
methods of interrogation, and the paradigm of asymmetric warfare,'" commonly
known as the "New Paradigm."" The objective is to identify possible lacunae in the
domestic judicial structure that may be most visible, in light of the novel nature of
asymmetric warfare. These lapses may be viewed through the prism of those
principles of transnational law whose authors contemplated formal warfare
between States and whose purpose was to protect the integrity of such States. Of
particular concern is whether this tactic of transporting apprehended suspects
across national boundaries may invite harsh interrogation by third-party States so
compellingly and routinely as to defy even the most conscientious of executive
intentions to forestall unintended consequences." To this end, this paper presents
an analysis of the logic behind extraordinary rendition and the principles that
should govern a straightforward solution for general practice in democratic
societies.
16. See the summary accounts below.
17. Bryan Bender, DIA Chief Predicts Rise in 'Asymmetric Warfare,' DEFENSE DAILY, Sept. 12,
1996, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is-vl92/ai-n286 7 3 609/. The term
"asymmetric warfare" first occurs in generally available references wherein the author ascribed the term
to Army Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, who was at the time the Defense Intelligence Agency's
director. Id. The author explained, "U.S. military action in the future will likely mirror the recent attacks
on Iraq, where the punishment dealt did not fit the crime." Id. He added, quoting LTG Hughes, "An
example where asymmetric measures could be taken is in countering terrorism.... Because terrorists do
not respect borders, the U.S. would not be able to respond immediately in the case of an attack....
Instead, it could preclude further attacks in indirect ways." Id. Responding to the question of bypassing
the option of a direct attack on Iraq, LTG Hughes said, "A symmetric response, tit for tat as it were, was
not possible. . . . It would have killed many innocent people. It would have had much more political
blowback than we have had and we would have had a much more difficult time engaging in the
activity." Id. The full term "paradigm of asymmetric warfare" first occurs with reference to the "New
Paradigm" during the administration of President G. W. Bush, but only in informal, online sources.).
18. The concept of the paradigm shift begins with Thomas Kuhn, philosopher of science. See
generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (3d ed. 1996). A paradigm
shift occurs when there is an overabundance of new discoveries that demand theories that the current
paradigm accommodates only with great empirical difficulty. The scientific establishment increasingly
questions its underlying assumptions. The more this occurs, the more resistance the current paradigm
imposes, until some scientists boldly introduce radically new frameworks of assumptions within which
to elaborate theory. The retiring paradigm inevitably produces some fervent defenders for a while, who
insist on debating the proponents of the new, even to the point of threatening careers. Moreover, insofar
as political power in society at large rests to any extent on perpetuating the old paradigm, advocacy of
the new becomes politically dangerous.
19. See Bob Drogin & John Goetz, Accused Pilots Traced to Johnston, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Feb. 19, 2007, 5:43AM), http://www.newsobserver/com/110/story/544844.html, for extensive details
linking both local CIA contractor Aero Contractors and three local pilots to the extraordinary-rendition
program in general, specifically to that of Khfilid al-Masri.
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II. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION IN THEORY
December 7, 1941, is more than a significant day in U.S. history, as it is
likewise one of great significance in European history, but for a different reason.
German Chancellor Adolf Hitler issued an order on that day known as the Night
and Fog Decree.20 This order directed German law enforcement to begin abducting
people under German control in Europe who might be hostile to the German
regime. The goal was to subject those people to military procedures or confinement
in concentration camps. Pursuant to the Chancellor's executive order, German
authorities abducted thousands of people from the territory then under German
control. The Chancellor believed that the best deterrent to insurgency was furtive
execution if merited by military proceedings, while leaving families only to ponder
the fate of those so abducted."
More surprising to observers in retrospect was the issuance of a similar decree
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt against U.S. citizens and legal residents of
Japanese, German, and Italian descent, pursuant to the same armed conflict, and by
precisely the same method, namely, an executive order.22 The President ordered the
abduction of thousands of U.S. citizens and residents based on a combination of
ethnicity and loose suspicions of sympathy with the enemy, or in the case of
Japanese citizens and residents, based on their ethnicity alone." The assumption
was that their ethnicity posed such a danger to U.S. stability as to trump
constitutional guarantees of civil rights.2 4
In summary, the actions of Chancellor Hitler and President Roosevelt were
identical in that they were the result of an executive order. In neither case did the
20. Nacht-und-Nebel-Erlass.
21. The Fiehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Nazi Consp[]iracy and
Aggression volume 7 Document No. L-90 (Dec. 7, 1941), in THE AVALON PROJECT (2008), available at
http://avalon.1aw.yale.edu/imt/ -90.asp.
22. Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, 61 J. POL. 445, 446 (1999).
See also Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) ("Authorizing the Secretary of War to
Prescribe Military Areas"). Commentators have often cited the hypocrisy of President Roosevelt's Order
in view of the sheer scale of the struggle that several States had to mount to defeat Hitler's regime, most
singularly notorious for its maltreatment of the Jewish population in Germany's occupied zones. Cases
brought before the Supreme Court as a consequence of this order included Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S.
214 (1944), Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Surprisingly, no president rescinded the order until April 1976, under Republican President G. Ford.
Proclamation no. 4417,41 Fed. Reg. 35 (Feb. 20, 1976).
23. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). See also Arthur Garrison, National
Security and Presidential Power: Judicial Deference and Establishing Constitutional Boundaries in
World War Two and the Korean War, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 609, 614 (2008-2009); FDR AND JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, ed.), http://www.fdr
library.marist.edularchives/pdfs/intemment.pdf.
FDR's military advisers recommended the exclusion of persons of foreign descent, including
American citizens, from sensitive areas of the country as a safeguard against espionage and
sabotage. The Justice Department initially resisted any relocation order, questioning both its
military necessity and its constitutionality. Id.
But the shock of Pearl Harbor and of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines fueled already
tense race relations on America's West Coast. In the face of political, military, and public pressure,
Roosevelt accepted the relocation proposal. Id.
24. Mayer, supra note 8.
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chief executive consult the legislature or submit a question for judicial review to
justify the decision. In the U.S. case, the logic behind the extraordinary
incarceration of innocent citizens and residents, which constitutes large-scale racial
profiling, clearly lacked any constitutional backing despite the judicial defense of
federal authority. In most cases the targeted individuals could not even be
categorized as suspects to any treasonous activity.2 5 Had the victims of the U.S.
version of this abuse of power met the eventuality of their German homologues it is
reasonable to expect that U.S. courts would have pronounced President Roosevelt's
actions as war crimes. However, that eventuality is less than certain, as the result
could have influenced events in the opposite direction, by mollifying and even
nullifying the Nuremberg trials themselves, given the consequent absence of the
necessary contrast.
This author asserts that for German mechanisms of judicial review, insofar as
they functioned, to have supported the power of the German Chancellor to order
abductions of the type described seems to be the product of intense political
corruption. The German r6gime would have had to take effective control of the
entire government and created a dictatorship by virtue of the assent of the non-
executive branches. The argument would seem to continue on the premise that the
German r6gime at the time of Chancellor Hitler's ascension lacked a reliable
structure of democratic checks and balances. This argument appears plausible on its
face, as few observers today would say that such a circumstance can easily emerge
in a democratic society absent such intense corruption. Nevertheless, if that is the
case, then what explains the U.S. example of the same basic infraction? Arguments
of stark differences in governance between Germany and the U.S. in the 1940s
serve to insulate commentators from the necessity to confront the implications of
the similarities. One of the essential roles of intellectual honesty in the discipline of
the law is to countenance the possibility that judicial failure in one democracy may
yet hold implications for another.
Black's Law Dictionary defines rendition as "the return of a fugitive from one
state to the state where the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime."" By
comparison, it defines extraordinary rendition as the "transfer, without formal
charges, trial, or court approval, of a person suspected of being a terrorist or
supporter of a terrorist group to a foreign nation for imprisonment and interrogation
on behalf of the transferring nation."27 President George W. Bush explicitly refused
25. 131 CONG. REc. E5603 (extension of remarks Dec. 12, 1985) (statement of Rep. Leon E.
Panetta) (discussing how Japanese-Americans were interned in violation of the U.S. Constitution).
26. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (9th ed. 2009).
27. Id. The entry includes a clarifying note, as follows: "When an innocent person is subjected to
extraordinary rendition, it is also termed erroneous extradition. When a transfer is made to a nation
notorious for human-rights violations, it may be colloquially termed torture by proxy or torture flight."
Id. Other sources refer to this practice as black rendition or outsourcing torture. Id. To be sure, the entry
in Black's Law Dictionary is excessively narrow, given the logic of the terminology itself, as it implies
that any rendition outside of legal parameters that does not pursue a rationale of terrorism must demand
an alternative term. In fact, extraordinary rendition most logically and most simply refers to rendition
absent a justifying legal apparatus.
85 [Vol. 27:77
A HYPOTHETICAL POSTULATE FOR EXTRAORDINARY RENDETION
to condone this practice insofar as it might lead to harsh interrogation. However,
allegations that the CIA nevertheless pursued its own policies in this regard, either
in defiance of or pursuant to the policies of the executive branch, led the Bush
administration's most vehement critics to accuse the administration of having
sought actively to permit it." Such critics have decried the practice as an abuse of
power by the executive branch that seeks only to "effect the transfer of persons to
non-judicial authorities for interrogation or torture."29 In other words, the tactic of
extraordinary rendition enables a State's executive branch to subject targeted
persons to harsh methods of interrogation in defiance of the State's own laws, by
way of a third party whose legal apparatus ignores such constraints.
The Supreme Court has yet to address directly the legality of the practice of
extraordinary rendition. It was relatively late in the period of the War on Terror 0
that Congress held its first hearings on the subject." It is a generally accepted
practice to render an accused person to the U.S. to stand trial.32 Extraordinary
rendition, by comparison, has historically had the goal of removing named foreign
criminals from one State and returning them to other States to stand trial or in some
other way suffer planned penalties for their infractions." In the case of U.S.
practice, as noted supra, the CIA evolved the practice of extraordinary rendition
during the administration of President Clinton, evidently as a last resort in trying to
manage an early phase of asymmetric warfare. It was often the case that officials
knew where to find certain terrorists but were unable to prosecute them in U.S.
courts due to concerns of national security." In theory, the U.S. may request a
foreign State to render a subject who had received a conviction in absentia. A
formal dossier supports the request, and the legal counsel of the CIA authorizes
28. The commentary in the U.S. House of Representatives is notorious for its vociferous attacks
against the opposition party, for which purpose rumors of extraordinary rendition were of some political
value during the administration of President G. W. Bush. For example, in 2004 Representative Edward
J. Markey of Massachusetts commented:
President Bush has asserted that 'the values of this country are such that torture is not a part
of our soul and our being.' The legislation I am introducing today is designed to ensure that
we not only ban torture conducted by our own forces but we also stop the practice of
contracting out torture to other nations. Torture enabled by extraordinary rendition is
outrageous and must be stopped.
150 CONG. REC. E1225 (June 23, 2004) (extension of remarks).
29. William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law: 'Extraordinary Rendition' and
Presidential Fiat, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q., 102, 103 (2006); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004); Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on
Transatlantic Relations: Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and
Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 11Oth Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearings].
30. As a defined era, the War on Terror is construable as beginning Oct. 7, 2001, when U.S.
military forces began striking Tilibin targets and al-Qd'idah training camps in Afghanistan. Patrick
Wintour et al., It's Time for War, Bush and Blair Tell Taliban, THE OBSERVER (Oct. 7, 2001, 2:13PM)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/politics.septemberl 1.
3 1. Id; Hearings, supra note 29.
32. See Mitchell J. Matorin, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction in
Lieu ofExtradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907 (2002) (detailed background on the legality of renditions in recent
U.S. history).
33. EUR. PARL. Ass., Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees
Involving Council ofEurope Member States, 17th Sess. Doc. No. 10957 (2006).
34. Id.; see also Mayer, supra note 8.
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each individual rendition." However, public confirmation of the objectivity of
proper legal review within the CIA is unattainable, so the expectation that the CIA
may function properly lacks transparency and hence merit by definition. Exploiting
the fiction that it is possible to ascribe civil conscientiousness to the CIA within
certain historical boundaries in the utter absence of evidence, while claiming the
opposite within other historical boundaries, opponents of the program allege that
the practice was perfectly acceptable while President Clinton held executive office,
but changed dramatically sometime in late 2001. The effect was to obviate the role
of the CIA legal counsel, presumably consistent with a new goal to facilitate
detention and interrogation, rather than removing terrorists from the territory.3 6 The
onset of a congressionally approved state of war did indeed establish the basis for
revised logic regarding the President's appropriate realm of decision-making
latitude (as explained below in Part IV), but the history of the executive branch's
success against all legal challenges suggests no difference whatsoever in either
administration's adherence to valid legal interpretations.
A. Examples of Extraordinary Rendition
The goal of the practice of rendering terrorism suspects for interrogation in
Southwest Asian nations during the administration of President Clinton was to
undermine the operating structure of al-QA'idah after the failed 1993 attempt by al-
Qa'idah affiliates to carry out the destruction of New York City's World Trade
Center." Michael Scheuer was among those CIA officials who appear to have
established the programmatic structure to support the new policy. At the time,
Scheuer was in charge of the CIA unit dedicated to addressing the challenge of
IslAmist militantism."8 Starting in 1996, Scheuer studied the operations and tactics
of al-Qa'idah. By 1997 he began planning the capture of Usdmah ibn Lddin," along
with the central command team of the al-QA'idah executive apparatus. Richard
Clarke, who was at the time serving as the acting director for counterterrorist
operations for the National Security Council (NSC), instructed Scheuer to
determine for himself how to erode the networks of Usimah ibn Ladin."
The core challenge lay in the U.S. judicial system's constraints of transparency
and due process as they applied to persons encountered on or transported to U.S.
35. Mayer, supra note 8.
36. STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM 149
(2006). See also EUR. PARL. Ass., Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of
Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States, 17th Sess. Doc. No. 10957 (2006); JOSEPH
MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 189 (2006).
37. Al-QA'idah [S6-ii], meaning "the base" in Arabic, refers to an infamous organization of
terrorists originally established in Afghanistan, who profess Isimist rationales to justify their variegated
attacks on Western civilians and other interests in many countries. See Jayshree Bajoria, al-Qaeda,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://wwwlcfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al
-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaidalp9l26.The common rendering is al-Qaeda.
38. Mayer, supra note 8.
39. 'Usimah ibn Ldin [I -LLy ] chief architect and once active commander of al-
QA'idah. The common rendering is Usama bin Laden or Osama bin Laden.
40. Mayer, supra note 8.
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civil jurisdictions. The CIA thus had concerns about bringing terrorism suspects to
U.S. courts and having to face the possibility of divulging secrets about U.S.
intelligence sources and methods." The array of parties of interest in the
prosecution of terror suspects would have presented obstacles along the path to
justice in this domain. Foreign governments might be reluctant to testify for fear of
exposing their own methods and sources of intelligence. Simple tasks, such as that
of establishing a chain of custody for a laptop computer, could expose methods and
sources that would likewise prevent agency officials from testifying. The U.S.
Department of State even halted the questioning of a relative of Usdmah ibn Lidin
out of deference to diplomatic immunity.4 2 Scheuer's mounting frustrations in
designing a way to accomplish his goal reportedly caused him to look elsewhere
for a way to capture and interrogate terrorism suspects.4 3
As a key U.S. ally in the currently international campaign to address the threat
of Islimist terrorism, Egypt constituted a logical choice for Scheuer to consult for
solutions. The Egyptian foreign-intelligence agency, Jihdz al-Mukhibardt al-
'Ammat al-Misriyyah," enjoys a reputation among Arab States for effectiveness in
carrying out the mission of gathering foreign intelligence of interest to national
security concerns.45 Since Egyptian President Hosni Mubirak46 came to power
following the assassination of President Anwar al-Sidit," Egypt has been under
constant emergency rule. In the few years after 1990, the Egyptian government
promulgated laws aimed at curtailing terrorist activity, which included conferring
broad powers onto the executive branch to arrest and detain suspects. According to
the activist organization Human Rights Watch, harsh interrogation in Egypt is now
commonplace as a result. In a January 2001 report to the Commission on Human
Rights, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture cited 32 instances of prisoner
deaths between 1997 and 1999 suspected to have resulted from methods of harsh
interrogation.4 8 Activist sources continue to assert that securing confessions by way




44. See supra text accompanying note 9. Authors frequently refer simply to the "Mulhibarit" in
reference to Egypt's intelligence service. However, the word mukhibarit [ La ], plural of
mukhibarah [ "communication" or "news traffic," alone fails to specify nationality, so the
practice of referring exclusively to Egyptian intelligence without the associated adjective is
unreasonable.
45. See the hyperbolic Neil MacFarquhar, Heavy Hand of the Secret Police Impending Reform in
the Arab World, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/intemational/m
iddleeast/14jordan.html, stating that the secret police, or mukhabarat in Arabic, is one of the most
powerful and ubiquitous forces in the Arab world.
46. Mu~ammad Ousni Mubirak [4)~ ]
47. Mu amnmad Anwar al-Sddit [anI g li ]
48. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EGYPT: HUMAN RIGHTS BACKGROUND, Oct. 2011, http://www
.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/Egypt-bck-I1001.htm.
2011] 88
CONNECTICUTJOURNAL OF INTL LAW
of harsh interrogation is a common source of support for politically motivated
convictions in Egypt."
President Mubirak's directives to defeat terrorism have targeted mainly radical
Islimists as political enemies. Many of these Egyptians have reportedly fled the
country with the intention of joining al-QA'idah.so If this is true, then President
Mubarak would have had great interest in getting these people back for
interrogation. News magazine commentators have reported that U.S. officials
suggested initiating a program of planned renditions of Egyptian suspects back to
Egypt from various world locations through the use of U.S. tracking and
interception resources." This plan would have served both U.S. and Egyptian
objectives. The U.S. would now have had a place to take its terrorism suspects,
while Egypt would have had a way to retrieve its own terrorism suspects.
III. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION IN PRACTICE
Extensive investigation by domestic and foreign entities and individuals has
yielded large amounts of testimony about the program of extraordinary rendition.
Some sources have alleged that the CIA runs the program by means of shell
companies that manage a fleet of several aircraft. These allegations include
purported records of thousands of flight plans said to match the timing of the
renditions believed to have occurred, as well as the subcontractors associated with
those flights.52
One suspected company, Aero Contractors, allegedly participated in activity
relating to the rendition of Lebanese Khilid al-Misri," a German citizen who
claimed that the CIA had abducted him while he was on vacation in Macedonia.54
Al-Misri reported that CIA operatives subjected him to harsh interrogation for five
months in Afghanistan before releasing him in Albania." It is conjectured that Al-
Misri was released when it was discovered he shared an identical name with an al-
Qd'idah suspect." In May of 2006, a federal court dismissed a lawsuit filed by
49. Activist sources routinely cite Egyptian security services and law enforcement as subjecting
detainees to harsh interrogation to promote the goals of interrogation against persons whose violent
frame of reference defies standard interrogation practices. Id.
50. Mayer, supra note 8, at 112.
51. Id.
52. See generally GREY, supra note 36.
53. Khdlid al-Misri [L -l J-iA]. The common rendering is Khaled el-Masri.
54. Craig Whitlock, Germans Charge 13 CIA Operatives, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at AO1.
55. Id.
56. Activist sources have generally preferred to assert that al-Misri shared a similar, rather than
identical, name to the al-Qa'idah suspect, perhaps in an effort to portray U.S. intelligence agencies as
inept. In fact, the names in Arabic are completely identical. Variations in the choice of the letter "e" or
"a" in the Arabic definite article in proper names are exceedingly common among Arabs who live in
societies that use the Roman script (except Turkey, which boasts firmly established transliteration norms
regarding Arabogenic names). Indeed, one person's national-identification card may show one spelling,
while his passport shows another. The same variation occurs with other transliteration artifacts, such as
the frequent choice of "e" to represent the long |1| sound, the use of "ou" alongside "u" to represent |ul or
jis|, and the confusing use of "e" to represent the long |i sound in some names.
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attorneys for al-MiSri against the U.S. government, on the grounds of protecting
state secrets. The Fourth Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal in March of 2007."
Likewise, Egyptian Ahmad 'Ajizah" claimed that the Swedish Security
Service (Stipo)" had apprehended him on Swedish soil in December of 2001 and
turned him over to CIA agents. 'Ajizah related that the latter had dressed him in
overalls, applied shackles, and placed him on a private jet, purportedly a
Gulfstream V, allegedly owned by a U.S. company.60 'Ajizah stated that the CIA
then flew him to Egypt, where Egyptian security personnel subjected him to harsh
interrogation.6 1
Another allegation involved Egyptian Muhammad Sa'd Iqbil Madni'6 who
claimed that Indonesian security personnel had abducted him in January of 2002
based on intelligence allegedly supplied by the CIA. Madni claimed that the CIA
suspected him of being an acquaintance of British citizen Richard Colvin Reid,
who had boarded a U.S. commercial aircraft with explosive devices inserted into
his shoes for the purpose of igniting them while in flight. Madni further claimed
that the Egyptian government had formally asked for his extradition once he was in
custody. Egyptian authorities specified no crime other than declaring Madni a
suspect in connection with terrorism. Receiving neither a hearing nor the benefit of
legal counsel, Madni was promptly flown to Egypt on a Gulfstream V.63 An
Indonesian agent thought that the extradition request provided a political obscurant
for the CIA to carry out its intent. "This was a U.S. deal all along, [...] Egypt just
provided the formalities.""
57. El-Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
58. Ahmad 'Ajizah [ -1 1i], commonly rendered Agiza, following Egyptian phonology.
59. Id.
60. Since the earliest inferences of the CIA's ostensibly routine use of Gulfstream V jets at
various airports around the word, their reference in activist commentary has come to raise the expected
specter of intrigue and imbue the said commentary with the appearance of greater legitimacy than it may
deserve. In fact, Gulfstream V jets, manufactured by Gulfstream Aerospace, are very common among
executives of both U.S. and Chinese companies that own private jets, in addition to the U.S., Greek,
Israeli, and Japanese military forces and limited Saudi and Kuwaiti use. The U.S. Air Force refers to its
jet of this type as the C-37A. Given their relatively common commercial and military use, a
conscientious effort to trace CIA patterns of travel thus requires spotters to report tail numbers with
great reliability, an outcome that too often defies objective confirmation by its very nature. See Dana
priest, Jet is an Open Secret in Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2004 at AOl.
61. Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE N.Y.C. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y.
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 15, at 9-10, n.2 1. The paper alleged that the Egyptian security service
had arrested 'Ajizah in 1982 based on a suspicion that his cousin had participated in the assassination of
President al-Sidit. Id. Following his release, according to the report, the Egyptian security service
continued to threaten and harass 'Ajizah, who finally filed a lawsuit against the Egyptian government in
1991. Fearing further persecution as a result, 'Ajizah said that he fled Egypt with his family to various
Southwest Asian countries before ultimately settling in Iran. An Egyptian military tribunal tried 'Ajizah
in absentia in 1999 for alleged membership in al-Jihid, an organization that the Egyptian government
had listed as terrorist in nature, and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment with hard labor, without
possibility of appeal. See also AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, Biography of PlaintiffAhmed Agiza, (May
30, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/biography-plaintiff-ahmed-agiza.
62. Hifizh Qhri' Muhammad Sa'd lqbhl Madni [,,- JL) - - Du i61,-].
63. GREY, supra note 36. See also Coop. Research History Commons, Profile: Muhammad Saad
Iqbal Madni, available at http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity-muhammadsaadiqba
Imadni.
64. See Coop. Research History Commons, supra note 63.
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There was also the case of Syrian Mdhir 'Arir,5 a dual citizen of Syria and
Canada suspected of ties to al-Qa'idah. 'Ardr alleged that the CIA had abducted
him in New York City during a routine change in flights from overseas.' Legal
briefs suggest that U.S. officials had denied 'Ardr access to legal counsel due to his
foreign citizenship."7 'Arir stated that agents had held him for several days in the
U.S. before his transport to Jordan and then to Syria, where he underwent
detainment in a cramped, underground room for nearly a year before his release
and return to Canada."8 'Syrian personnel allegedly subjected 'Ardr to several hours
of beatings and forced him to falsely confess to having attended an al-Qa'idah
training camp in Afghanistan. Although Canadian officials evidently visited with
'Ardr and inquired about his condition throughout his captivity in the Syrian prison,
'ArAr gave no indication of his alleged subjection to harsh interrogation until after
several meetings had taken place." Finally, U.S. authorities were able to secure the
return of 'Ardr from Syria to Canada." 'Ardr likewise filed suit against the U.S.,
but the court dismissed his case on national security grounds."
A 2006 New York Times article reported allegations that CIA and Italian Secret
Service agents had grabbed Hasan Mustafa Usimah NaSr," a militant Egyptian
cleric, off a street in Milan, Italy, in February of 2003 and flew him to Egypt,
where Egyptian authorities subjected him to harsh interrogation. 3 Upon NaSr's
scheduled release nearly a year later, Egyptian authorities allegedly kept him in
prison for a further two years before his ultimate release. In an affidavit that he
wrote to Italian legal authorities, Nasr recounted that his harsh interrogation
consisted of subjection to "electric shocks while he lay on a wet mattress in a Cairo
prison."" Egyptian authorities allegedly beat him repeatedly and "forced [him] to
eat rotten bread in a pitch-black cell, while rats and cockroaches ran over his
65. Mihir 'Ardr [j.- &L], often rendered incorrectly as Mihir 'Ar'ar [> 4-]. The common
spelling is Maher Arar.
66. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'don reh'g, en banc, 585
F.3d 558 (2d. Cir. 2009). See also PETER JAN HONIGSBERG, OUR NATION UNHINGED: THE HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 188 (Univ. Cal. Press) (2009).
67. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 250. See also HONIGSBERG, supra note 66.
68. GREY, supra note 36. See also Michael V. Sage, Note, The Exploitation of Legal Loopholes
in the Name ofNational Security: A Case Study on Extraordinary Rendition, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 121
(2006) (discussing the case of Mihir 'Ardr from the perspective of international law).
69. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 255 ("Prior to each visit [by Canadian officials], Arar was warned not
to disclose that he was being mistreated. He complied but eventually broke down during the fifth
visit.").
70. The Canadian government exonerated 'Arkr and compensated him in the amount of
CAD10.5 million for its role in the error of information that led to these events. Beth Gorham, U.S.
Senator Expects Briefing Next Week from Attorney General on Arar Case, CNEWS, Jan. 26, 2007,
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2006/12/12/pf-2754203.html.
71. Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Extraordinary Rendition and Disappearances in the 'War on
Terror,' 10 GONz. J. INT'L L. 70, 72 (2006).
72. Hasan Mustafa Usimah Nasr [j .u A ] known as Abl 'Umar, commonly
rendered Abu Omar.
73. GREY, supra note 36, at 190-213 (providing details on his rendition and alleged CIA
involvement).
74. Elisabetta Povoledo, Egyptian Says He Was Tortured after Being Kidnapped in Milan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 11,2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/11/world/Europe/Ilitaly.html.
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body."" In mid-2005, an Italian judge responded by identifying and issuing
extradition warrants against several CIA agents, suspecting that they might have
played a role in the kidnapping."6
One method used by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to combat
abuse has been to bring suit against those who play a supporting role in
extraordinary renditions, particularly the aircraft and flight support companies. For
example, in May of 2005, the ACLU sued Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., on behalf of
three alleged victims of extraordinary rendition. The complaint stated:
Since at least 2002, Jeppesen has provided direct and substantial services
to the United States for its so-called "extraordinary rendition" program,
enabling the clandestine and forcible transportation of terrorism suspects
to secret overseas detention facilities where they are placed beyond the
reach of the law and subjected to torture and other forms of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. Publicly available records demonstrate
that Jeppesen facilitated more than seventy secret rendition flights over a
four-year period to countries where it knew or reasonably should have
known that detainees are routinely tortured or otherwise abused in
contravention of universally accepted legal standards."
Jeppesen's International Trip Planning service was the target of allegations
that it had provided logistical support for the CIA in the extraordinary-rendition
program." The ACLU alleged that Jeppesen was aware of CIA intentions to permit
individuals to be subject to harsh interrogation. A Jeppesen senior official stated in
a closed-door meeting, "[w]e do all of the extraordinary rendition flights-you
know, the torture flights. Let's face it, some of these end up that way."" The ACLU
had brought the lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute, which allows aliens to bring
claims in U.S. federal court for violations of international law or treaties."
IV. THE PARADIGM OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
After the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September
11, 2001, the Bush administration enunciated a new outlook on the rules of
engagement. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales used the term "New Paradigm" to
75. Id.
76. Ian Cobain et al., Destination Cairo: Human Rights Fears over CIA Flights, THE GUARDIAN,
Sept. 11, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/12/usa.politics. See also Articles
about Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/pe
ople/n/hassan_mustafa osamanasr/index.html (documenting the online series of N.Y. Times articles
that pursued this story).
77. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Mohamed et al. v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-02798-JW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007).
78. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues Boeing Subsidiary for Participation in CIA Kidnapping
and Torture Flights (May 30, 2007), http://www.overbrook.org/newsletter/0607/pdfs/ACLUSummer.pdf
79. Id. (quoting Jane Mayer, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/arch
ive/2006/10/30/ 061030ta talk mayer).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
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describe this new outlook." Vice President Richard Cheney described its meaning
on a Meet the Press interview, stating:
[T]he government needed to "work through, sort of, the dark side...."
Cheney went on. "A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be
done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are
available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to be successful.
That's the world these folks operate in. And so it's going to be vital for us
to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective."82
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was among the major architects
of the legal theories behind the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare. Yoo and others
authored a series of memoranda that in their entirety advised the President that he
had "almost unfettered latitude in his prosecution of the war on terror."" They told
the President that he was under no obligation to comply with the 1949 Geneva
Convention in handling detainees. They classified the detainees as "enemy
combatants," a classification unprotected by the Geneva Convention. In January of
2002, the President suspended the applicability of the Geneva Conventions on
enemy combatants in the War on Terror, and subsequently left wide deference to
the CIA. In February, the President stated in a written memorandum that even
though the Geneva Conventions fall short of applying to detainees captured in the
War on Terror, those detainees should still receive humane treatment by the
military personnel responsible for maintaining them.84
The CIA arguably remained an exception in this regard due to the President
never having addressed this concern specifically with reference to foreign-
intelligence operations." Yoo continued to design and voice the underlying
ideology behind the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare within the context of the
U.S. Constitution. At the core of the paradigm were the plenary powers of the
Commander-in-Chief, combined with the gaps in the Geneva Conventions, which
effectively excluded combatants who chose to operate outside the laws of any
State. Yoo stated, "[w]hy is it so hard for people to understand that there is a
category of behavior not covered by the legal system?"" He further stated that
Congress lacked the power to prevent the President from dealing with asymmetric
combatants in any manner in which he might see fit. Referring to the ongoing
debate over whether to expand the category of torture to previously excluded
interrogation techniques, Yoo stated that Congress has no authority to "tie the
81. JEREMY BRECHER, JILL CUTLER, & BRENDAN SMITH, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY:
AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 131 (2005). See also Mayer, supra note 8.
82. Mayer, supra note 8.
83. Id.
84. Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees to the Vice President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://lawofwar.org/Bush-me
moGenevas.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). See also Mayer, supra note 8.
85. Id.
86. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 957, 972 (Dec. 2009). See also Mayer, supra note 8.
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President's hands in regard to torture as an interrogation technique. . . . [Ilt's the
core of the Commander-in-Chief function. They can't prevent the President from
ordering torture. "87
V. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PARADIGM OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
I also want to talk to you about national security. Make no mistake about
it, we are at war. We're at war with an enemy that attacked us on
September the I Ith, 2001. We're at war against an enemy that, since that
day, has continued to kill."
President George W. Bush left no doubt in the minds of either the U.S.
citizenry or his administration about his commitment to defeating terrorism when
he enunciated these words shortly after the Pentagon had undertaken to describe the
War on Terror as "The Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism." The Paradigm
of Asymmetric Warfare refers to a shift in policy dating from late 2001, under
which the U.S. government took the position that the War on Terror is by definition
a type of war, rather than a concerted campaign by law enforcement against trans-
national criminal interests." The Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare thus has
implications for interpretations of traditional treaties, conventions, and legislation
that had criminal activity as its focus. On this matter, Attorney General John
Ashcroft noted that the primary focus of the War on Terror must be on "identifying
threats of future terrorist acts, preventing them from happening, and punishing
would-be perpetrators for their plans of terror."" This change in assumptions, from
the previous paradigm of combating crime to the later one of waging war where
trans-national terrorism is at issue alters the constitutional premises for executive
action. Specifically, if Congress recognizes a state of war, it may choose to
authorize action on the part of the executive branch intended to prosecute that war
expeditiously. In time of war, the urgent need for information to halt impending
threats may overrule considerations of due process."
The resulting National Security Strategy policies are more proactive, as they
emphasize preemptive practices against opponents based on inferences of "hostile
87. Mayer, supra note 8.
88. President George W. Bush, Address at the Gaylord Texan Resort and Convention Center
(Aug. 3, 2005) (discussing America's response to 9/11 in the context of the War on Terror).
89. President George W. Bush, President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for
Democracy (Oct. 6, 2005) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re
leases/2005/10/20051006-3.html) (comparing war against Islamic radicalism to war against ideology of
communism).
90. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. on Prevention of Acts Threatening Public
Safety and National Security to Heads of Dep't of Justice Components, (Nov. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 200 1/November/01_at580.htm.
91. Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House's War on Terror,
THE NEW YORKER, Jul. 3, 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/03/060703fa-facti.
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capabilities and generally hostile intent."92 Obtaining critical intelligence from
detainees to protect against future terrorist acts outweighs the considerations of due
process that would prevail under the assumption that international terrorism is a
criminal matter rather than one involving wartime assumptions. In defense of his
advice that none of the Geneva Conventions has any relevance to either the Taliban
or al-QA'idah, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales wrote, "[i]n my judgment, this
new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy
prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions."" In agreement, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo argued in favor of the doctrine of unilateral
executive action, given that the chief executive's role as Commander-in-Chief
affords the President plenary power under Article 1I of the U.S. Constitution,
empowering him to bypass treaty restrictions and prevent congressional
interference in waging war." Despite this understanding of plenary powers in time
of war, President Bush steadfastly refused to order extraordinary methods of
interrogation. Other memoranda concluded that the Geneva Conventions bear no
applicability to those elements of war in which the combatants refuse to observe
the requisite protocols (such as the wearing of recognizable military uniforms)."
Therefore, the memoranda conclude, President Bush has plenary power to use force
in the War on Terror," and the legal limits on the use of harsh interrogation are
broader than under the assumption of criminal prosecution."
VI. U.S. POLICY COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Extraordinary Rendition as Against U.S. Policy
By definition, there can be no statute to authorize extraordinary rendition.
Congress has expressed its intent to honor its duty to uphold U.S. obligations in
laws and treaties against extraordinary methods of interrogation and the extradition
of prisoners that may be subject to harsh interrogation in the target State. At the
same time, the White House has maintained a policy of condemning extraordinary
methods of interrogation. However, under both Presidents Bush and Obama, such
92. Amel B. Enriquez, The US National Security Strategy of 2002: A New Use-of-Force
Doctrine?, 18 AEROSPACE POWER J. 31, 32 (2004) (providing ample background on the change in
National Security Strategy since that of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which requires either vital
national interests to be at stake or that the political objective be important, clearly defined, and
comprehensible).
93. John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26.
94. Mayer, supra note 8.
95. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel on Application of the
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to President
George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002).
96. Peter Slevin, Scholar Stands by Post-9/11 Writings on Torture, Domestic Eavesdropping;
Former Justice Official Says He Was Interpreting Law, Not Making Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 25,
2002, at A3.
97. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen. on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Albert R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1,
2002).
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methods have evidently been permitted, using identical rationales and with
identical assurance of securing compliance from receiving States to abide by U.S.
expectations." Therefore, any policy that authorizes extraordinary rendition would
contravene the espoused laws and policies of the U.S. government.
In enacting the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
(FARRA), Congress clearly stated that it is contrary to U.S. policy to:
Expel, extradite, or otherwise affect the involuntary return of any person
to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the United States.99
However, the FARRA only applies to transfers that originate from U.S.
territory, so it may fall short of addressing the type of extraordinary rendition at
issue. The ambiguity here is how the judiciary interprets the law regarding
jurisdiction. A major presumption in the law is that the policy applies only to those
within U.S. jurisdictions." This interpretation removes any protections that this
law might afford to any non-U.S. citizen facing extraordinary rendition. However,
the intent of Congress is arguably inferable as seeking to prohibit U.S. officials
from involvement in any transfers, whether inside or outside U.S. territory, to any
State in which the likelihood of the suspect's subjection to harsh interrogation is
greater than that of his freedom from the same. In an amendment to the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Iraq War and Tsunami Relief of 2005
(P.L. 109-13), Congress recommitted itself to the principles of the FARRA.
Congress stated that it would refuse to fund any program that "subject[s] any
person in the custody or under the physical control of the United States to torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'"' Later, in an April 2005 press
conference, President Bush responded to a query on extraordinary rendition by
stating, "[i]t's in our country's interests to find those who would do harm to us and
get them out of harm's way. And we will do so within the law, and we will do so in
honoring our commitment not to torture people. And we expect the countries where
we send somebody to, not to torture, as well."0 2 On balance, as enunciated here, the
President's intention seems literally to have held, and likewise under the current
98. Strother, supra note 3.
99. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112
Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (1998).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(1)(A) (2006) ("[Wihen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General
shall remove the alien from the United States. . . .") (emphasis added). See also, e.g., David Weissbrodt
& Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 608
n. 105 (Summer 2006) ("[N]either the regulations governing extradition nor those governing removal
proceedings under FARRA are designed to apply to persons being transferred by, or with the complicity
of, U.S. actors outside the United States to third states.").
101. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 1031, 119 Stat. 231, 256 (2005).
102. The President's News Conference, I PUB. PAPERS 680, 692 (Apr. 28, 2005).
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President. Of particular note and of relevance to both administrations, such a
position may yet invite the possibility of subjecting individuals to circumstances in
which harsh interrogation may occur, albeit only by foreign States' agencies, while
diplomatic assurances will also enjoy the reliability of all diplomatic
communication, which ceases at the boundary of the foreign State in question.
In addressing domestic laws and extraordinary rendition, it is also important to
note that the FARRA is a legislative product of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (CAT).'o0 The FARRA implemented the CAT, as the CAT contains
no provision for self-execution. Thus, by virtue of the FARRA, the U.S. now
considers itself bound to the convention, but only within the limits of the
corresponding legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress.
B. Extraordinary Rendition as Against International Law
In addition to the CAT, the United States is a party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),'" the Geneva Convention of
1949, and the Refugee Convention of 1951. These treaties prohibiting harsh
interrogation have become customary international law, a norm, or jus cogens.os
These treaties also prohibit refoulement, which refers to the transfer of an
individual to a State where there is a "substantial likelihood" of subjection to
103. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(b), 112
Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (1998); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
104. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; The
U.S. Senate declared the ICCPR non-self-executing, adding reservations as follows:
(1) That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United
States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
(2) That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.
(3) That the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that 'cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.
(4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in force at the time the
offence was committed, the United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1
of article 15.
(5) That the policy and practice of the United States are generally in compliance with and
supportive of the Covenant's provisions regarding treatment of juveniles in the criminal
justice system. Nevertheless, the United States reserves the right, in exceptional
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of article
10 and paragraph 4 of article 14. The United States further reserves to these provisions with
respect to States with respect to individuals who volunteer for military service prior to age
18.
S. EXEC. Doc. No. 102-23 (1977).
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009). Latin for "compelling law," jus cogens is a
"mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the
intemational community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." Id.
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extraordinary methods of interrogation.o6 While the CAT neglects to prevent
refoulement to States in which individuals may face cruel treatment, the ICCPR is
somewhat more rigorous, in that it does prohibit refoulement to States in which the
individual may be "at risk" of harsh interrogation or cruel treatment.o' The 1949
Geneva Convention prohibits both, but it only applies to prisoners of war and
civilians classified as "protected persons" as related to armed conflict."' This
creates a lacuna, which provides for the possibility of exploitation or error.
The three treaties-CAT, ICCPR, and the 1949 Geneva Convention-have
required that the signatories criminalize extraordinary methods of interrogation by
their officials or those who act under the direction of those officials.' According to
the treaties, the U.S. is under obligation to investigate, for possible criminal
sanctions, each case of extraordinary rendition to determine if there are reasonable
grounds to infer an instance of harsh interrogation. If U.S. investigators determine
that any agents of the U.S. had a part in unlawful extraordinary rendition, then they
must initiate criminal proceedings."'
Thus, through the ratification of the CAT and its implementation by means of
the FARRA, the U.S. has an obligation to prevent, prosecute, and punish
extraordinary methods of interrogation or complicity to the same,"' while under the
ICCPR, the U.S. has an obligation to prevent extraordinary rendition per se. In the
interpretation of the Human Rights Committee, Article 7 of the ICCPR requires
that signatory States "must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by
way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement."ll2 The Human Rights
Committee may therefore find that the U.S. is liable for each instance of
extraordinary rendition or refoulement of anyone under U.S. legal control.
Article III of the 1949 Geneva Convention warrants granting "combatants"
status as prisoners of war (PWs) if they are members of armed forces. PWs merit
certain protections and due process. The status of persons apprehended within the
legal jurisdiction of the War on Terror is a key factor here. The U.S. has
categorized these individuals as "enemy combatants" or "security detainees," a
category that affords no protection under the 1949 Geneva Convention.
106. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1394 (9th ed. 2009). More precisely, refoulenent refers
specifically to the transference of refugees between states, so it differs frorn rendition in that the
transferred person's status is not a consequence of a condition of persecution or similar class of
circumstances beyond his control. Id.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 104. See also, e.g.,
Satterhwaite, supra note 71.
108. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 15, at 31.
109. Id.
110. Satterthwaite, supra note 71, at 1394.
111. Id.
112. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 15, at 54 (quoting U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm.,
Oct. 9, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 at 202.).
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1. International Law Implicated
The Geneva Conventions are so outdated and are written so broadly that
they have become a sword used by terrorists to kill civilians, rather than a
shield to protect civilians from terrorists. These international laws have
become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution."'
Generally, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is in effect in a time of
peace, while International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which implies the law of war,
takes effect in a time of armed conflict. There are conflicting theories about
whether the IHL supersedes the IHRL totally. Specifically, it is a point of debate
whether only those portions of IHL treaties that contain derogation clauses
supersede provisions of IHRL treaties, or whether all provisions exist concurrently,
subject to interpretation against the context of contrary provisions."'
By definition, cruel, inhuman, or degrading (CID) treatment is contrary to
international law. This is fundamentally a matter ofjus cogens, as the terms cruel,
inhuman, and degrading are normatively negative across political cultures. This
author posits that, insofar as actions undertaken by a State are construable as cruel,
inhuman, or degrading, other States will either oppose the actions or protest against
the ascription in order to maintain political alliances, but no State will condone
both the ascription and the target State's actions. Specific definitions, as applied to
various treaties and within U.S. domestic legislation, vary considerably."' The next
sections will describe individual treaties that proscribe CID activities among
signatory States."I
2. Geneva Conventions
Although the U.S. ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1949, it was only in
1996 that Congress, then under the control of the Republican Party,"' enacted the
113. Alan Dershowitz, Rules of War Enable Terror, BALT. SUN, May 28, 2004, at 17A (wherein
the author explains the theory of the metaphorical "ticking time bomb," for which he advocates
subjugating countervailing rules to the urgent necessity of obtaining intelligence data from terrorists).
114. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International Detainee
Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REv.657, 700-04 (2006) (featuring a useful theoretical discussion); Elena
Landriscina, Criminalizing Extraordinary Rendition: Global Civil Society and the Promise of
International Law 3-7 (Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales, Working Paper No. 27, Mar. 5,
2007) (Arg.), available at http://www.caei.com.ar/es/teoria.htm (providing an analysis of the
development of IHRM and IHL).
115. For an analysis of definitions of harsh interrogation, see Satterthwaite, supra note 71 at 2-4;
David Weissbrodt, Materials on Torture and Other 111-Treatment, SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS (3d ed. 2001), 24; TORTURE BY PROXY,
supra note 15, at 35-36.
116. Id.
117. This fact is significant in that the history of the outcry over extraordinary rendition seems to
rely on the presence of a vocal opposition to the party in power; hence, a President of one party with a
Congress of the other will appear to have engaged in the practice inordinately. In fact, however, the only
serious attempt to broaden the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to U.S. policy has been the one
noted here.
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War Crimes Act to formally criminalize grave breaches thereof."' Articles 13, 14,
and 17 of the Third Geneva Convention cover Prisoners of War (GPW) and
prohibit CID activities. Articles 130 and 131 render signatory States accountable
for CID activities that occur at the hands of entities under their control.'19 The
Fourth Geneva Convention (GC) covers civilians, namely, persons affected by the
waging of war who fall outside the GPW category. Articles 31 and 32 of this
Convention prohibit CID activities undertaken against civilians. Analogous to the
latter provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, Article 148 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention again serves to hold States accountable for CID activities undertaken
by way of entities under their control. Applied to civilians, Article 147 specifically
tries to prohibit any instance of "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
protected person."'2 0
Because international terrorists nominally or actually associated with al-
QA'idah or the Tdlibin refuse to abide by the protective provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, 2 ' President George W. Bush's legal counsel very carefully and
correctly defined al-QA'idah and Tdlibin detainees as falling outside the aegis of
the Geneva Conventions.'2 2 Opponents of those policies of President Bush that
sought to address how to handle al-Qa'idah and TAliban detainees insisted that no
category of person may fall outside either the GPW or the GC,12 3 a patent
misinterpretation of the design of the Geneva Conventions, which only addresses
the jurisdictions and parties to a formal war between States.
As an ancillary matter, a popular argument in favor of this latter point of view,
raised at the height of the public debate on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the
fact that the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) on prisoners of war outlines strict
118. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of
War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 343-47 (2007).
119. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T.
3316, 3420 [hereinafter GPWJ.
120. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC].
121. For example wearing recognizable uniforms, intentionally targeting civilians, and exploiting
for use as staging grounds types of buildings and locations prohibited by the Geneva Conventions (for
example, Islamic religious shrines and cemeteries, which U.S. military forces avoid targeting except
under the strictest use of authorization channels).
122. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 118, at 300. The authors presented a framework for
determining status vis-a-vis the Geneva Conventions, namely, the following sequence of questions: (1)
Is there currently an armed conflict involving High Contracting Parties (i.e., signatories to the Geneva
Conventions)? (2) If the answer to the first question is negative, then does any High Contracting Party
currently occupy any territory recognized to belong to another? (3) If the answer to either the first or the
second question is affirmative, to whom do the Conventions afford protected-person status? (4) For
those persons so identified, what rights and protections do the Conventions afford them? The authors
then provided a critique of the rationales advanced by the Bush administration's legal counsel in defense
of its declaring al-QS'idah and Tilibin terrorists exempt from the Geneva Conventions.
123. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 45, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 602, n.l (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). This commentary suggests that every person possesses some
status under the Geneva Conventions, whether that of prisoner of war (Third Convention), civilian
(Fourth Convention), or member of a medical staff (First Convention). The arguments suggest that no
one in enemy hands can possibly fall outside protection of the Geneva Conventions. Id.
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procedures for safeguarding enemy combatants removed from the war zone,
regardless of their status under the Geneva Conventions.'24 However, this is a
product of U.S. Army doctrine per se, rather than international treaty or even super-
ordinate U.S. policy. Army doctrine rejects disparate treatment by type of enemy
combatant, excepting the segregation of persons by rank (officers versus enlisted
personnel).'2 5 This is a question of efficiency, rather than propriety, as by this
method, Army officials are able to forgo lengthy debates about the appropriate
manner of treating prisoners before expeditiously prosecuting violations. Part of the
U.S. Army's history is the My Lai incident in Vietnam, which arguably provided
considerable fodder for opponents of the war and consequently constrained the
U.S. government's latitude to prosecute the war as the situation dictated.2 6 This
ultimately led to an inability to manage the arrangement which would have
concluded the war as worked out in 1972, serving instead as an opportunity for the
enemy to regroup and force U.S. forces to abandon the war zone prematurely.127 As
a consequence of that experience, the U.S. Army treats all PWs as though they fall
under the Geneva Conventions, whether this would be a valid or an invalid
inference, to eliminate the possibility of error in that judgment.128 That the noted
FM may provide a useful model for general U.S. policy is another matter, one
possibly worth exploring. However, the components of U.S. Army doctrine must fit
the totality of the same. On balance, arguments that the executive branch must
follow FM practices relating to PWs merely betray naivet6 about military practices.
A 2004 memorandum authored by Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith
provided legal support for the practice of transferring detainees from the war in
Iraq to other countries for the purpose of interrogation."' Given the different nature
of the war in Iraq from that against al-QA'idah or Tiliban operatives, this practice
may violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the
transfer of protected individuals away from a territory under military occupation.',o
124. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 19-40 - ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR,
CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND DETAINED PERSONS (Nov. 1952) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL 19-40]
available at http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fin-19-40-enemy-POW-civilian-intemees-and-deta
ined-persons.shtml; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED
PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES 1-5(a)(2) (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter ARMY
REG 190-8] ("All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the
GPW until some other legal status is determined by competent authority.").
125. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE § III 92,
available at http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fin-27-10-the-law-of-land-warfare.shtml (regulating
equality of treatment of prisoners of war aside from provisions relating to rank and sex); see also ARMY
REG. 190-8, supra note 124 ("All prisoners will receive humane treatment without regard to race,
nationality, religion, political opinion, sex, or other criteria.").
126. See generally, e.g., William George Eckhardt, My Lai: An American Tragedy, 68 UMKC L.
Rev. 671 (Summer, 2000).
127. Id.
128. See ARMY FIELD MANUAL 19-40, supra note 124, at 1-2; ARMY REG. 190-8, supra note 124.
129. See Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at
AO1.
130. Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, Assistant U.S. Att'y Gen. on Permissibility of
Relocating Certain "Protected Persons" from Occupied Iraq to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
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Significantly, Goldsmith warns near the end of his memorandum that observers
may possibly consider the practice in Iraq a grave breach as defined under GC
Article 147 and raise accusations of war crimes under domestic law."' That
President George W. Bush sought clarification of this restriction demonstrates an
informed concern for the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, the difficulty
presented by this provision revolves around the identification of a unique category
of enemy combatant. The Geneva Conventions fail to consider the intrusion onto
occupied territory of an enemy whose intent is as much harm to the occupier as it is
to the occupied population. Nevertheless, by entering territory occupied by
coalition forces, terrorists actually benefit from a new kind of protection, despite
the fact that they also represent a new kind of danger, in essence seeking to kill all
parties, rather than the occupier alone. In this scenario, the Geneva Conventions'
quest to protect non-combatants in a war between States inadvertently hampers the
power of military forces to assist in that protection.
3. U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment and Punishment (CAT)
I want to reiterate the United States Government's absolute commitment
to upholding our national and international obligations to eradicate torture
and to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
worldwide. The President of the United States has made clear that 'torture
anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere' and that 'freedom
from torture is an inalienable human right.' Beyond the protections in our
Constitution..., United States criminal laws prohibit torture. There are no
exceptions.132
The 2006 annual report issued by the Committee against Torture criticized the
U.S. for purported violations of both human rights law and humanitarian law. It
also demanded an end to extraordinary rendition."' However, the Committee's
failure to distinguish between military and civilian contexts in its inconsequential
statement undermines the legitimacy of its arguments. For its part, the U.S.
considered itself as acting within CAT boundaries.'34 Attorney General Gonzales
contended that, in the case of enemy combatants who fall outside the protections of
President, (Mar. 19, 2004), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/library/foreign-and-intemational-
researchlIraq-research/doj march 19.pdf.
131. Id. at l4 n.14.
132. John B. Bellinger III, Dep't of State Legal Advisor, Opening Remarks at the U.S. Meeting
with U.N. Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006), in US. Periodic Report to Committee Against
Torture 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 703 (2006); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Curel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984).
133. Bellinger, supra note 132, at 705.
134. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention,
46 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 585, 610 (2006) (for extensive analysis of the applicability of CAT to the practice
of extraordinary rendition).
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the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. must observe restrictions against CID actions
only with regard to persons within U.S. territory.' Should U.S. agents extradite
such persons to foreign countries in which CID actions constitute a standard mode
of interrogation, there is no legal authority to obstruct it, principally because the
enemy combatants themselves have rejected the Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile,
the U.S. ratified the CAT with the declaration that Articles 1-16 are non-self-
executing, a position that federal courts have upheld.' 6 Although irrelevant to the
case of persons who lack Geneva Conventions protection, the U.S. has further
defined "substantial grounds" as constituting a subjective probability (by way of
the ordinary advisement process in national security affairs) greater than 50%.'"
This position is particularly problematic, as national security advice must depend
on diplomatic assurances from receiving countries that specify detainees will
remain free from the threat of harsh interrogation.' In those cases in which such
assurances emanate from countries previously criticized by the U.S. for human-
rights violations, the difficulties associated with subjective estimates, even by
experts, become more manifest, since there is virtually no expeditious way to
monitor compliance.' 9
4. Refoulement and the ICCPR
The ICCPR fails to include any specific prohibitions of refoulement
Nevertheless, some have argued that extraordinary rendition violates Article 7.'o
The Human Rights Committee, which oversees due observance of this treaty
among signatory States, has in fact enunciated this understanding, in association
with the practice of forced disappearance."'
5. International Criminal Court (ICC)
The Rome Statute indicates which actions constitute crimes against humanity,
prosecutable in the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC lists forced
135. Sage, supra note 68, at 138.
136. Chesney, supra note 114, at 676-91 (for analysis of the possible mechanisms to implement
Article 3).
137. 136 CONG. REc. 36192-93 (1990).
138. Sage, supra note 68, at 137 (suggesting that the action of turning Mthir 'Arir over to
Jordanian authorities, where he allegedly incurred beatings prior to his transfer to Syria, sought to lessen
the "perceived foreseeability of Arar's eventual torture").
139. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
(2006). Individual country reports on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which have been destinations for U.S.
rendition for persons detained in the War on Terror, have criticized these countries for using methods of
harsh interrogation, contrary to assurances made to U.S. authorities as a condition for rendition.
140. Satterthwaite, supra note 71, at 19-26 (examining the interpretation of Article 7 through
construction and purpose, specifying U.S. reluctance to recognize the prohibition of refoulement in the
ICCPR, which includes CID treatment as well as torture, while Article 3 of the Third Geneva
Convention prohibits only torture per se).
141. Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under
International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309, 322 (2006).
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disappearance as falling among the crimes within its jurisdiction, in addition to
complicity, aiding, and abetting, on the matter of CID treatment.142
The common premise for differentiating the War on Terror from traditional
wars in the past, particularly the refusal of enemy combatants to wear identifiable
uniforms, the lack of clear battlefields, and the enemy's blatant violations of the
Geneva Conventions in all other ways, was also applicable to the Vietnam War.
Author Joseph Margulies points out that the U.S. adopted a policy in Vietnam
regarding the treatment of enemy combatants that observed the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions, despite the opportunity to argue that they failed to apply in
that case as well. 43 Specifically, enemy combatants in Vietnam who refused to
wear a uniform arguably removed themselves from protection under the Geneva
Conventions. In that conflict, it was the unilateral choice of the U.S. to apply
Geneva Conventions rules.'" Nevertheless, the distinction between enemy
combatants in Vietnam and those in the War on Terror is much graver than merely
a question of uniforms, as those enemies in the latter conflict also fail to represent
any State in their actions. That the Geneva Conventions seek to regulate
relationships among States, rather than policies within States, is a critical
distinction, which differentiates the scope of international law in conventional and
asymmetric types of warfare.
Opponents of the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare have contended that the
Yoo and Bybee memoranda amounted to sheer misstatements of the law.' If the
Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare is difficult to construe under current
international law, it is inherently problematic. This is because such an observation,
if shared by the international community, could make the U.S. appear to disregard
its obligations under international law. In turn, it is conceivable that such a
conclusion could constitute some manner of precedent to justify more egregious
actions by other States, which may fail to observe the difference between
categories of persons protected under the Geneva Conventions and those whom the
Geneva Conventions ignore. While it is hardly rational to speculate that those
entities responsible for international terrorism will escalate their destructive activity
upon claims that the U.S. appears to have violated international law, it is
nevertheless conceivable that such entities will use whatever arguments they find
available to try to foment sympathy for their cause against the U.S.
142. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 15, at 11.
143. MARGULIES, supra note 36, at 79-81.
144. Id.; see also GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973 61 (1975).
145. See generally Sylvie Kauffmann, La Bataille pour la Dimocratie: Une Affaire de Principe,
LE MONDE, Oct. 26, 2004; MARGULIES, supra note 36, at 89-95; Mayer, supra note 8. For details on
extraordinary renditions that have allegedly taken place outside of Iraq, see GREY, supra note 36;
MARGULIES, supra note 36.
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VII. DEFENSES
A. Diplomatic Assurances
Where detainees are subject to transfer, the United States has relied on
"diplomatic assurances" from target States as a basis for proper transfer.
Diplomatic assurances are letters or statements from target States that individuals
delivered into their custody will remain safe from subjection to extraordinary
methods of interrogation. Relating to the CAT:
[R]egulations implementing CAT provide that if assurances are obtained
by the secretary of state from the government of a specific state "that an
alien would not be tortured there if the alien were removed to that
country" and such assurances are forwarded to the attorney general or the
secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the official to whom
this information is forwarded shall determine, in consultation with the
secretary of state, whether such assurances are "sufficiently reliable" to
permit the alien's removal to that state without violating U.S. obligations
under Article 3 of CAT.'"
There is no requirement for the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland
Security to disclose their uses of diplomatic assurances.
The U.S. used diplomatic assurances in the 'Ardr case. There, U.S. officials
received assurances that 'Ardr would enjoy protection from extraordinary methods
of interrogation.147 After holding 'Ardr for ten months, Syrian officials found no
connection between him and al-QA'idah. 'Ardr was subsequently released. This
case may illustrate that U.S. efforts to obtain diplomatic assurances of freedom
from the threat of extraordinary methods of interrogation may fall short of good
faith. 14
. Human Rights Watch also reported on the 'Ajizah case. As previously noted,
Swedish officials rendered 'Ajizah to Egypt, having obtained diplomatic assurances
that 'Ajizah would be safe from harsh interrogation or other maltreatment, would
receive a fair trial, and would be free of any threat of a death sentence.149 Human
Rights Watch alleged that 'Ajizah underwent harsh interrogation while in Egypt,
and that Swedish officials may have expected such treatment.'s0
Reliance on diplomatic assurances to address the determination of the
likelihood of harsh interrogation may indeed be permissible under international
146. MARGULIES, supra note 36.
147. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CASES INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE;
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAY 2005 18-20 (2007), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/01/23/cases-
involving-diplomatic-assurances-against-torture-0.
148. MARGULIES, supra note 36, at 143.
149. See generally id.
150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 147, at 14-15.
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law, but this is still a gray area. The effectiveness of such assurances, as evidenced
by past extraordinary rendition cases, raises many questions. However, the
suggestion that diplomatic assurances are ineffectual as a general matter of
international law is even more problematic, for international law must emphatically
begin with the premise that all non-contending States are existential equals, and
their pronouncements valid, until such a time as one State adopts a policy vis-a-vis
another that formally questions such promises.
B. State Secrets
The major weapon used by the U.S. government against lawsuits that seek to
challenge extraordinary rendition is the state secrets privilege. The ACLU's
visceral disdain for the Bush administration's effective application of this theory is
visible in its commentary:
The state secrets privilege, when properly invoked, permits the
government to block the release of any information in a lawsuit that, if
disclosed, would cause harm to national security. However, the Bush
administration is increasingly using the privilege to dismiss entire lawsuits
at the onset. The government has invoked the privilege to evade
accountability for torture, to silence national security whistleblowers, and
even to dismiss a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination. This once-rare
tool is being used not to protect the nation from harm, but to cover up the
government's illegal actions and prevent further embarrassment.'
In February 2008, a District Court sided with the U.S. government and
dismissed the lawsuit under the state secrets principle. According to dejected
ACLU staff attorney Ben Wizner, "U.S. courts once again accepted flawed
arguments from the Bush administration and handed the government the ability to
engage in torture, declare it a state secret, and escape legal scrutiny and
accountability."" 2 The U.S. Government has historically used the state secrets
privilege rather easily. Opponents of the Bush administration in particular have
sought with vigor to undermine it, but to no avail."' The agencies that may declare
state secrets to avoid scrutiny are those that receive protection from the privilege.
They are under no requirement to reveal if there is in fact a state secret at issue.
In March 2008, New York Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced
legislation to limit the use of the state secrets privilege. The ACLU reported the bill
as follows:
151. Background on the State Secrets Privilege, ACLU, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/na
tional-security/background-state-secrets-privilege.
152. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Appeals Dismissal of Extraordinary Rendition Lawsuit against
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Congressman Nadler's legislation will reinstate the role of the judiciary as
a check against abuse of power as it will require a court more closely to
examine the government's national security claims for legitimacy. We
can't allow our president's actions to go consistently unchallenged when
there is evidence of government misconduct, simply because the
government invokes 'state secrets."4
Despite the most skillful efforts of its opponents, the great care that the Bush
administration took to leverage the complex detail of the interacting legal premises
in the pursuit of its goals in the War on Terror have successfully defied all attempts
to unravel the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare. The Nadler bill failed to achieve
its goal on behalf of the opposition.
1. Domestic and International Response
Some European States, including Italy, Germany, Sweden, Spain, and Iceland,
have thus far attempted to address that portion of the practice of extraordinary
rendition that has allegedly made use of their airspace or territory to conduct
investigations and have occasionally pursue prosecution.'" The effectiveness of the
Bush administration's legal apparatus is manifest in the fact that Federal courts
dismissed all cases so filed, based on national security concerns.
The best gauge of the extent of the international response to the practice of
extraordinary rendition comes from a report prepared by the European Parliament
after several months' investigation by a temporary committee established to
investigate the alleged participation of European countries in extraordinary
rendition operations."' Members of that temporary committee appeared before the
House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight, to defend its findings.'
The 77-page report asserted that the practice of extraordinary rendition on the
part of various States' foreign intelligence agencies is only construable as illegal.
Although the committee observed that terrorism constitutes a legitimate threat to
EU security and requires legal means for combating it on EU member States'
territories,' it opined that any rendition that leads to secret detention must by
definition constitute a case of enforced disappearance,"' which the EU should
disclaim as unacceptable. An underlying assumption of the committee's
conclusions was that no one on EU territory may fall outside the protections of the
combination of national, EU, and international treaties on the matter of due
154. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Lauds Introduction of House State Secrets Bill (Mar. 13,
2008), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-lauds-introduction-house-state-secrets-bill.
155. John Harrington et al., National Security, 40 INT'L LAW. 487, 493-94 (2006).
156. See generally European Parliament, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the
CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention ofPrisoners, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-9999 (2007).
157. Hearings, supra note 29.
158. Report on The Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and
Illegal Detention of Prisoners, EUR. PARL. DOC. A6-9999 (2007) at 5-6.
159. Id. at 4.
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process.'" In particular, the committee cited Article 10 of the ICCPR as requiring
the conferring of due process rights on any persons detained on EU territory.'"' On
the matter of theory, the committee specified that the peremptory norm of
international law (jus cogens) prohibits extraordinary methods of interrogation per
se.162 Significantly, the committee concluded that U.S. sources had left too many
questions unanswered as posed by alleged victims, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), media sources, and government representatives. The committee went on
to say that this silence has cast some degree of doubt over the U.S. position that its
activities have excluded CID treatment.' The committee also opined that
extraordinary rendition constitutes an extra-judicial practice that will fail to hold up
to international standards of human rights if indeed it involves arresting suspects,
as opposed to convicted terrorists.'" Finally, the committee expressed a belief that
extraordinary rendition is ineffectual as a way to combat international terrorism.'
The committee called for intensified cooperation among governments in
fighting the War on Terror within a legal framework. It stressed the existence of
established rules of law that require harmonious observance and noted that if there
are challenges that require a change in such laws, it should constitute a joint action
rather than a unilateral one." The committee pointed to the need to afford all
suspects and detainees on EU territory the due process of law, in the same manner
as U.S. agents have interpreted the treatment of detainees on U.S. territory. During
the hearings, Representative Dana Rohrabacher defended the position that
international terrorists fall outside the protections of the Geneva Conventions, but
acknowledged the possibility that the pursuance of policies that are overly broad
may inadvertently compromise the civil rights of innocent civilians in the
process.' 7 CIA Director Michael Hayden had previously complained privately to
diplomats at the German Embassy in Washington about EU officials' criticisms of
the extraordinary rendition program.'8
In December of 2005, Representative Markey introduced a bill that would
have directed the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, as well as
the Attorney General, to supply selected details to the House of Representatives
that relate to the possibility of extraordinary rendition operations in the case of
certain foreign individuals.' 9 The bill received a poor reception on the House floor,
so Representative Markey submitted another bill that more generally called for the




163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 30.
167. See generally Hearings, supra note 29, at 39.
168. Walter Pincus, CIA Chief Complains About Agency's Critics in Europe, WASH. POST, Apr.
17, 2007, at A12.
169. H.R. Res. 593, 109th Cong. (2006).
170. H.R. Res. 1352, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Congress to curtail extraordinary rendition has succeeded, even under the
dominance of the opposition (Democratic) party since January of 2007.
VIII. A CONCEPTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICO-LEGAL SYMMETRY
The administration of President George W. Bush was careful to review and
observe the legal implications of all of its wartime activities. In so doing, it was
successful in warding off all challenges to questions concerning the practice of
extraordinary rendition. The correctness of the administration's adherence to legal
detail arguably reflects both iron-clad legalism and sufficient control over the
actual processes at issue, contrary to the most vociferous claims of vocal activists
and activist groups during the seven years that the Bush administration watched
over the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare. Had there been any meaningful gaps
between law and practice, the sheer scale of the onslaught of accusations by the
administration's energetic opponents on the question of extraordinary rendition
would have resulted in more observable effects than merely a few bills in the U.S.
House of Representatives devoid of any compelling logic. The administration was
correctly uncooperative with inquiries into allegations against the CIA or its
operatives, as it operated strictly within careful legal interpretations and was under
no compulsion to sacrifice executive prerogative for the sake of appeasing critics.
For example, the administration refused to extradite CIA operatives identified
by Italian authorities as possibly complicit in a kidnapping that had occurred on
Italian soil."' Indeed, it would have been wrong for the administration to comply
with such an order, as the relevant authority is patently lacking on the part of the
Italian judicial branch. However, on the matter of pursuing a resolution to the
question of extraordinary rendition, what is most interesting about the Italian order
is the asymmetry of governance that it highlights between the Italian and U.S.
postures on the matter. The Italian judicial branch lacks both authority over and
even symmetry with the U.S. executive branch. Perhaps more interesting still is the
unasked question of whether the Italian judge was even aware of his consequent
inefficacy in this matter (a reasonable assumption, given that the contrary
proposition presupposes a level of ignorance on his part that is frankly
unfathomable) and thus had greater motivation to issue the order, knowing its inert
nature. This substantive politico-legal asymmetry hints at the core of the solution to
the problem at hand.
Neutral observers and visceral opponents alike should by now recognize that
the essence of the problem of extraordinary rendition as a legal matter lies in the
question of rendition, rather than in what is construable as extraordinary.
Opponents sought all variety of ways to undermine the policies of the
administration of President George W. Bush, but to no avail. By now it has become
clear that the administration of President Obama fully assents.
Furthermore, even before President Obama's accession, the return of both
houses of Congress to the opposition party in January of 2007 changed nothing
171. Craig Whitlock, US. Won't Send CIA Defendants to Italy, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2007.
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with regard to the desire to change U.S. policy, a fact that only highlights the legal
correctness of the prior administration's policies, regardless of how vehemently the
administration's opposition, particularly the ACLU, insisted on challenging them.
Even more striking is the fact that since January of 2009, the opposition party's
considerable margin of dominance in both Congressional houses and the executive
branch failed to challenge the previous administration's policies on extraordinary
rendition.' The combination of inaction on the part of a supremely powerful
Democratic party and explicit announcements by Democratic President Obama that
President Bush's policies will remain intact must force the objective observer to
accept the legal validity of both presidents' positions, even if only in retrospect
with regard to President Bush.
The War on Terror continues, albeit under the guise of new terminology, and
the Chief Executive has issued no Executive Orders to contravene explicitly any
practice that the previous administration might indeed have condoned on the matter
of extraordinary rendition. Suddenly, the opponents of the administration of
President Bush are almost completely silent on this question. With few exceptions,
they are forgoing the opportunity to seek to hold the current administration to the
same standards, with the same insistence, as they did the previous, by demanding
the same transparency and changes in executive branch policy.
Clearly, a proper analysis of the phenomenon should thus return to the
definition itself. As previously indicated, extraordinary rendition is rendition
devoid of the backing of treaty. Thus, it is inherently transnational in nature.
Conversely, no action may fall under this definition unless it transcends national
borders. Disregarding the specific details of relevant laws, it is an overarching
principle of politico-legal structural symmetry that the practice of rendition in the
absence of treaty has lacked."' It is thus an adherence to a principle of politico-
legal structural symmetry that renders extraordinary rendition ordinary.
172. David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, But With More Oversight, N.Y.TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2009 (revealing that Congress has not acted to prevent the Obama administration from
continuing the Bush administration's policy of extraordinary rendition).
173. Traditionally, the concept of legal symmetry only appears in discussions of tort law, as they
confront questions of balancing the penalty for the harm done to a party against the degree of that harm,
or by extension inferring similarly deep degrees or broad jurisdictions of reasonable care on the part of
all parties of equal legal status (for example, Jeremiah Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children
Entering without Permission, 11 HARv. L. REv. 349, 364 (1898)). Nevertheless, the principle of legal
symmetry enjoys a long history in matters involving codes of law (for example, Edward B. Whitney,
The Doctrine of Store Decisis, 3 MIcH. L. REV. 89, 105 (1904); James Brown Scott, The Work of the
Second Hague Peace Conference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1908)), and it is so implicit in legal structures
that arise therefrom that its ubiquity goes unnoticed. A notable example is the close similarity of
politico-legal structures across the fifty United States, despite the absence of compulsion toward such a
creation. Theorists in the organizational sciences refer to this effect as "mimetic isomorphism." Paul J.
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147, 147 (1983). The same term is certainly
applicable in the legal disciplines, but all that is necessary in the present discussion is to refer to the
observation of the symmetry of generally accepted political and legal objectives both across democratic
political jurisdictions and between civilian and military jurisdictions of a given national jurisdiction. For
want of a more convenient but sufficiently specific term, the present exploration will refer to this fairly
universal legal principle, which precedes the enactment of statutes to create the resulting edifices,
simply "politico-legal symmetry."
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A principle of politico-legal symmetry should begin with the identification of
the core action, which involves apprehending an individual in a State's territory.
Whether in a time of war or a time of peace, an apprehension requires a legal
justification. In a time of war, any inference of hostile intent in a jurisdiction of
combat is sufficient to justify apprehension. The controlling authority (i.e.,
occupying military forces) in that jurisdiction carries out the apprehension so as to
reduce the potential for harming anyone who turns out to be an innocent bystander.
Inferences of hostile intent in such a context constitute exceedingly rapid appraisals
with a high margin of error, so the whole process of apprehension must structurally
include opportunities for applying an opposite, exceedingly low, margin of error."'
This structural feature consists of provisional incarceration, which allows time for
inspection. Incarceration is feasible because the inherent hazard of a jurisdiction of
combat already compromises innocent bystanders' safety and restricts their liberty.
Thus, the principle that justifies provisional incarceration in a jurisdiction of
combat implicitly seeks a balance against the potential for preserving incarcerated
individuals' liberty outside of that jurisdiction.
In a time of peace, by comparison, law enforcement authorities must make a
different kind of inference involving the probability of identity. The controlling
authority (i.e., law enforcement) in a peaceful jurisdiction carries out the
apprehension so as to increase the potential for capturing anyone who turns out to
be a party to an alleged crime. As in the military case, inferences of identity
constitute rapid appraisals with a high margin of error. The process of apprehension
must therefore structurally include an opportunity for applying an opposite, low
margin of error. Provisional incarceration is briefer than in the military case, as it
benefits from no justification based on dangers in the environment, but the relevant
inspection is easier than in the military case, because it merely involves a task of
positive identification. This task appears to be made easier in a time of peace by the
fact that identifying credentials are typically more readily available than under the
174. The concept of error as applied to the law is almost as unconscious, but just as theoretically
substantive, as that of politico-legal symmetry discussed above. Nevertheless, common-law court
systems incorporate as a matter of design a safeguard to minimize error in convictions, namely, the
adversarial process and the principle of innocence unless there is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Opposing parties in a criminal case must make an effort to lay out convincing evidence of their
respective positions. However, the prosecutor has the more difficult task. Rather than happenstance, this
inequality seeks to minimize erroneous convictions. By doing so, it also happens to increase the
proliferation of erroneous acquittals, but this is an acceptable cost in common-law societies for the
greater objective of preserving a maximally free social structure. Viewed statistically, the process
minimizes the less desirable margin of error, namely, that which would undermine freedom if applied
generally. Legal discussions do broach the topic of margin of error occasionally, when discussing
matters of broad concepts of legal structure, for example William L. Ransom, The Layman 's Demand
for Improved Judicial Machinery, 73 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 132, 166 (1917), but it is
conceivable that such principles warrant more common dialog than is currently the case.
By extension from underlying statistical premises of criminal law in common-law States, it is feasible
to discuss the relationship between margin of error and the compensatory legal structures that exist in
zones of peace and war, respectively, while understanding the distinct legal processes that operate
therein based on their distinct levels of characteristic urgency and order, along with the unequal nature
of the flow of information in each. The reader will recognize that this is the logic pursued herein, as this
is consistent with the breadth of the concepts of legal structure that the present discussion seems to
warrant.
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chaotic conditions that prevail in a time of war, which includes the possibility of
many homeless parties who are unable to secure any identifying credentials.
The difference between a time of war and a time of peace in this sense
involves the legal authority behind the apprehension. Part of this difference
involves a definition of the domain of war and the domain of peace, discussed
below. Meanwhile, in a time of war, the legal authority also constitutes the
enforcement authority. By comparison, in a time of peace, the legal authority
constitutes an independent judicial authority. This is the essence of the changing
prerogatives of the executive under the two conditions. What is missing with
respect to the present task of resolving the question of extraordinary rendition is the
matter of transferring an apprehended person across politico-legal boundaries.
Resolving this matter by reference to a principle of politico-legal symmetry
restores the judicial authority to the relevant process in the military case, thus
effacing the structural difference by virtue of the transnational nature of the action.
The first element of the principle of politico-legal symmetry involves the
observation that a military authority has legal jurisdiction over a military zone,
while a judicial authority has legal jurisdiction over a non-military zone.
Transference of any apprehended person from one zone to another must occur, as a
matter of principle, through the common assent of the relevant judicial authorities,
even though the executive authorities conduct the transition. In the military zone,
the judicial authority is identical to the enforcement authority, while in the non-
military zone, the two authorities constitute separate entities in a government of
separately empowered branches. In essence, the transference of an apprehended
person across the boundary between a military and a non-military jurisdiction
requires military authorities in the former to talk to judicial authorities in the latter.
A proxy for such a conversation is, of course, a treaty, which represents the judicial
pronouncements of a non-military jurisdiction and thereby permits direct contact
between the military authorities and law enforcement, respectively."' Absent a
treaty, judicial authorities must engage in conversation over questions of
transference. Those judicial authorities, where they are separate from enforcement
authorities, thus offer the necessary assent for the executive body to take action
where appropriate.
It is critical, and indeed a valid target of legal activism, to delineate military
and civilian jurisdictions of territory completely. It is illogical to construe U.S.
territory as in a state of war merely because the U.S. is itself in a state of war
against a defined overseas enemy (particularly a stateless enemy). Under martial
law, U.S. territory is by definition in a state of war, but outside of that context, it
constitutes civilian territory, even if the U.S. currently occupies a foreign territory
militarily. Congress may be in a position to alter existing delineations where
necessary, such as by proscribing, for example, Manhattan Island as provisionally
175. The question of the effect of treaties is a critical point, because an ideal structure will be
consistent with one guided by treaty without necessitating treaty. By virtue of this, it will abide by the
same principles in both cases, rather than the countenancing the prospect of arbitrariness. Thus, the
principle of politico-legal symmetry will also result in a solution that is both recognizable and imitable
by other States and hence accommodate the evolution of more compatible transnational structures.
2011] 112
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
in a state of war for a specified time. Similarly, whether by treaty or protocol,
specific jurisdictions in an occupied land, such as Afghanistan at the present time,
may warrant similar distinctions, possibly including contingent zones of dual
authority (e.g., U.S. and Afghan military) according to established protocols.
The second element of the principle of politico-legal symmetry involves the
recognition of natural asymmetries in politico-legal structures across distinct
politico-legal jurisdictions. That is, different States have different laws and often
very different legal definitions."' The transfer of an apprehended person from one
jurisdiction to another requires legal symmetry. A person may be guilty of a crime
within the context of one jurisdiction, without affecting his status in the other. At
one extreme of a continuum of possible asymmetries, there may lie a presumption
of innocence in the receiving jurisdiction, despite valid findings of a crime in the
jurisdiction of origin. At the other extreme, there may lay existential agreement on
every detail of judicial review. Even under the umbrella of a single State, civilian
and military conditions are often sufficiently distinct to render a person who would
be innocent in the former subject to incarceration in the latter, at least for the
duration of hostilities.7 7
Nevertheless, without judicial review there can be no conclusion about judicial
symmetry. Thus, military law enforcement authorities, which lack legal authority
outside military jurisdictions, have no philosophically coherent capacity to transfer
apprehended persons directly across politico-legal boundaries. If they do so, they
will conceivably subject a person suspected of a crime under one jurisdiction's
definitions to another jurisdiction in which the interplay among legal definitions,
social expectations, and political criteria might result in a different judicial
outcome. An extradition treaty resolves this asymmetry by creating a common legal
justification for apprehension in both jurisdictions. Absent a treaty, there must be
an apparatus for supplying the structure of judicial authority to permit the transfer
of apprehended persons across politico-legal boundaries.
An overview of the possible modes of common judicial structure across
jurisdictions includes a variety of potential combinations. Between military
jurisdictions under the same overarching military authority, the transfer of
apprehended persons must have the consent of the latter. Between independent
military jurisdictions, the transfer must have the consent of common accord
between the respective military authorities, which necessarily includes review by
176. See, e.g., Mahdi Zahraa, Legal Personality in Islamic Law, 10 ARAB L.Q. 193, 193 (1995)
(legal definitions change across political borders in a multitude of ways, such that one State's rape, for
example, may fall short of a crime in another State which discusses a fundamental distinction in the
definition of a legal person under shari'ah, compared to common and civil law, which can lead to
critical differences in certain findings of criminal behavior).
177. This is a common claim on behalf of detainees at GuantAnamo Bay Naval Base. While it is
plausible to propose that all detainees appeared to have hostile intent on the field of battle and therefore
merited incarceration, the greater margin of error in observations of guilt and innocence in a war zone
(due to the combination of the relative level of chaos and the more rapid determination that observers
must make) creates a mathematical expectation of manifest error. Until such a time as it is feasible, from
the perspective of the interests of national security, to try those people, it is conceivable that the
incarcerated include some innocent men.
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the super-ordinate executive authorities. From a military to a non-military
jurisdiction under the same State apparatus, the transfer must have the consent of a
judicial authority in the latter, and in the opposite case it must begin with a finding
of merit for apprehending the person in question and then benefit from the assent of
the military authority to receive him. Between military and non-military
jurisdictions under distinct State apparatus, judicial authorities on both sides,
sufficient to represent the respective interests of the States in question (as opposed
to subordinate entities within them) must consent to the transfer based on their
respective judicial criteria.
Whether the U.S. alone adopts such a structure and the associated policy, or
whether other States do likewise, is immaterial. Whichever the case, each State
must observe its own policies of interaction between the judicial and executive
branches. Reliance on diplomatic assurances remains unchanged in this sense.
Thus, the controlling authority behind whether a given State's diplomatic
assurances are sufficient is the judicial authority, which in turn must rely for such
decisions on congressional determinations of law."' Absent either a congressional
determination or a practice of international law that Syria, for example, constitutes
a judicial exception in cases of transferring apprehended persons across national
boundaries, the judicial authority must assent to it, as long as the evidence of the
requisite legal parameters is manifest. Such legal parameters are again a product of
Congress or firmly established standards of international law, which may possibly
proscribe the rendition of suspects (absent a treaty), while approving that of
convicted persons.
IX. A STRUCTURAL PROPOSAL TO ACCOMMODATE EXTRAORDINARY RENDTION
A structure to accommodate the communication of the requisite assent
between parties (enforcement agencies and judicial agencies, as the interface
between the two politico-legal jurisdictions indicates) would involve little more
than a closed court of rendition, under the structure of the Supreme Court in some
fashion."' The requisite statutory language might amount to an amendment to the
178. That is, diplomatic assurances from receiving States that transferred persons will not undergo
harsh interrogation must maintain their merit based on the concept that sovereign States are equals in
matters of transnational activity. However, in this interpretation, it is no longer the executive branch that
judges the validity of such assurances on its own. Here, the judicial authority may identify a basis in
international law for withholding assent.
179. The term "national-security court" appears frequently in that segment of the popular press
dedicated to questions of holding enemy combatants under the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare. See,
e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for a National Security Court, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 2007; Neal Katyal,
A National Security Court: Not Now, Not Yet, GEO. SEC. L. CMT. (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.securityl
awbrief.com/commentary/2008/10a-nationalsecu.html; Bill West, National Security Court? We Already
Have One, IPT NEWS (Jan. 26, 2009); GLENN SULMAsY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A
NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009). But See David Latin, Revolutionary
Change in Somalia, 62 MERIP REP. 6, 12 (Nov. 1997) (Nevertheless, the term is both too vague (given
that the proposals to set up a "national-security court" usually wish merely to create a secret court,
separate from the ordinary apparatus that currently requires so much transparency as to compromise
questions of national security) and indeed somewhat problematic, as past usage of the term has often
referred to something quite different, such as Somalia's special court for prosecuting high crimes that
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPDA) of 1996,8s which
includes provisions for an Alien Terrorist Removal Court. The judicial process
undertaken in such a venue must exclude the possibility of contending parties that
present contending arguments, as its deliberations must remain secret. However,
such a court would then be able to operate in a condition ofjudicial review, without
the necessity to defer to exceptions for the protection of state secrets. A
congressional committee may receive reports from such a body to communicate the
extent to which the executive branch has complied with its judgments. Such a
congressional body would, in turn, have authority to investigate inconsistencies by
appointing an independent counsel (or desirably by some other method that proves
more expeditious). Importantly, a closed court of rendition cannot merely amount
to a secret court with specially appointed judges and counsel, for that remedy by
itself resolves nothing. The principle of politico-legal symmetry must be present in
its construction.'81
CONCLUSION
Extraordinary rendition has evolved from a system for the interstate transfer of
suspected criminals based on treaty under an assumption of due process, to what
opponents describe as an elaborate network of secret prisons, sites dedicated to
might compromise the 1969 revolution); Jos6 Murilo de Carvalho, Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil,
1930-45, 62 THE HiSP. Am. HIST. REv. 193, 209 (1982) (court with a similar purpose in 1930s Brazil).
See also Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1216 (1996) (Likewise, the term has sometimes referred to the
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a product of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA)); Christopher H. Pyle, The Invasion of Privacy, 34 PROC. OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 131, 136
(1982). A more specific term, such as "closed court of rendition," may possibly avoid confusion.
180. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996). (Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich introduced the bill as part of the Republican Congress's
"Contract with America" commitments, the precursor of this particular commitment in the "Contract
with America" was the terrorist bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. The Supreme Court
upheld the law's limited suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651
(1997)).
181. It is conceivable that the legal procedure carried out by a closed court of rendition should
seek to disconfirm the merits of a proposed rendition, rather than seek to confirm them, and to do so
rapidly. Seeking to disconfirm gives those apprehending the authorities the benefit of the doubt, so the
court would constitute a minimally obstructive legal intercessor in matters of national security, a
compromise that would increase the margin of error by comparison to criminal procedure. Meanwhile,
the court should also have a contingent option to order very limited incarceration pending some manifest
likelihood of the emergence of disconfirming material, such as might have occurred in the case of M&hir
'Arir, had there been an authority equipped with a means of verifying a matter of identity that legal
counsel could have pursued within such a structure, a process that might compensate for the higher
margin of error just mentioned, in a way that still minimizes interference with national security.
Requiring rapid decisions, rather than permitting slow processes, such as in criminal proceedings, would
also increase the margin of error in favor of findings of merited rendition, so to compensate the structure
might well require accommodating the role of a public counsel with the authority to pursue targeted
information even after the court has permitted a rendition. Meanwhile, failure to disconfirm the merits
of a proposed rendition would remain a separate matter from that of assenting to a receiving country.
Ultimately, a closed court of rendition would probably eliminate all instances of renditions that might
have occurred with the furtive objective of enabling harsh interrogation and thus limit themselves to
those that are conducive to mutual cooperation across States on matters of managing transnational
terrorism.
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extraordinary methods of interrogation, shell companies, extreme legal theories,
and human-rights abuses. Some challenges to the U.S. program of extraordinary
rendition have emerged abroad, but even the current administration seeks no
change to the policies of the previous. Political relations may suffer some strain if
the costs of this program ultimately start to outweigh the benefits. At any rate, it
seems desirable for U.S. policy to come to a point at which it is no longer necessary
to refer to any transnational practices as extraordinary. The recommendation of a
closed court of rendition may offer a simple solution to what has evidently been an
exceedingly complicated question from the perspective of the principles that have
historically guided U.S. policy, even if the intricate legal details upon which U.S.
policy has assumed its present posture have proved impermeable so far.
Inter arma silent leges is Cicero's maxim that recognizes that laws are silent in
time of war. This maxim presumes the existence of applicable law, as in the case of
extraordinary rendition. As previously noted, there are several domestic and
international laws, treaties, conventions, and doctrines that could justify curtailing
the practice in principle. The question that remains, viewed from the perspective of
international law itself, is to what extent the U.S. policy should try to mold its legal
instruments more coherently around a core set of principles that concords with U.S.
cultural history, rather than continue to pursue the letter of the body of U.S. and
international law with little concern over the fact that perhaps the spirit has left the
body.
In the aforementioned hearings by the temporary committee, Baroness Sarah
Ludford accused the U.S. of being anxious to enforce international law as it might
pertain to intellectual property, while wishing to evade international law on the
matter of international terrorism.B2 Some commentators have expressed similar
views regarding the role of the U.S. in helping found the International Criminal
Court for the enforcement of international law, only ultimately to refrain from
subjecting U.S. citizens to its jurisdiction."' Still others have argued that some of
the policies of the Paradigm of Asymmetric Warfare, including that of
extraordinary rendition, seek by design to obtain maximum intelligence from the
subjects with minimal accountability under the law.'" If those questions were valid
during the previous administration, they remain equally valid under the current.
In a memorandum to the General Counsel of the Secretary of the Air Force,
Major General Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate General, noted
disagreements with some of the opinions of the Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel and described some of the techniques used abroad as violations if
182. Hearings, supra note 29 (indicating that, while the U.S. is anxious to enforce its intellectual
property rights laws, it cannot choose to enforce one area of law while neglecting another).
183. See, e.g., Gary D. Solis, The ICC and Mad Prosecutors, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 1102,
1102-03 (Barry E. Carter, et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003).
184. For detailed analysis of the question of accountability in the War on Terror, see generally
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32395, U.S. TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN IRAQ:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2005); Reed Brody, Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for
the U.S. Abuse ofDetainees, 17 HuM. RTS. WATCH, No. 1(G), 2005 at 16.
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committed under the jurisdiction of domestic criminal law.' Rives expressed
worries about the liability of the interrogators and chain of command in employing
such techniques and noted that prosecution was a possibility in future political
regimes, as well as by the international community."' In his memorandum to the
President, Attorney General Gonzales cited the Secretary of State as disagreeing
with the President's conclusion that the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention fall short of applying to al-QA'idah and Talibin detainees under any
circumstances. Gonzales assured the President that the Department of Justice had
concluded differently and that the President had the constitutional authority to
make that determination final. He then went on to note both the positive and
negative consequences of doing so and concluded that the arguments for reversing
the determination as requested by the Secretary of State were unpersuasive.'"7
Gonzales thus revealed full awareness of the situation when he opined that the U.S.
had never previously denied the application of the Geneva Conventions and that the
U.S. would be unable to invoke the GPW against any al-QA'idah or Tilibin
operatives who might capture U.S. troops abroad.'" Likewise, allied States of the
U.S. would probably condemn any invocation of the War Crimes Act in that
context. This may have the effect of deterring other countries from extraditing
suspects to U.S. custody, which "could undermine U.S. military culture which
emphasizes maintaining the highest standards of conduct in combat."'" Given the
context of these concerns, particularly the implicit reference to the prospect that al-
Qa'idah might one day decide to operate according to the terms of the Geneva
Conventions, they would seem to represent legal theories almost as extreme as
those that opponents have ascribed to the Bush administration. It may be worth
noting that such broad warnings of the possibility of incidental breaches of
international standards of conduct, while worthy of discussion on the matter of
crafting a coherent remedy for all irregularities in U.S. foreign policy might have
affected the present administration's policies if they possessed merit. Nevertheless,
the present administration's insistence on duplicating the applicable policies of the
previous one appears to have rendered such warnings extraordinarily silent.
185. Memorandum from Major General Jack L. Rives, U.S. Air Force, Final Report and
Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to
Interrogation of Detainees Held By the US. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. 5, 2003) (This
affirms the prior note about the distinction in definitions across politico-legal boundaries, which can
render an innocent man guilty or conversely nullify a crime under certain circumstances.)
186. Id.
187. Gonzales, supra note 95.
188. Admittedly, any expectation that al-QA'idah or TAlibfn operatives might treat U.S. captives
according to the terms of the Geneva Conventions are barely worth considering. These groups are by
their nature at odds with international law in all domains of their behavior.
189. Id.
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